Technology resistance and globalisation with trade unions: the choice between employment protection and flexicurity by Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Straume, Odd Rune
                             
“Technology resistance and globalisation with trade 
unions: the choice between employment protection 
and flexicurity” 
 
Kjell Erik Lommerud 
Odd Rune Straume 
 
NIPE WP 25/ 2007
  
 
“Technology resistance and globalisation with 
trade unions: 
the choice between employment protection and 
flexicurity” 
 
 
 
 
 
Kjell Erik Lommerud 
 
Odd Rune Straume 
 
 
 
 
NIPE* WP 25 / 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
URL: 
http://www.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe 
                                                 
* NIPE – Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas – is supported by the Portuguese Foundation for 
Science and Technology through the Programa Operacional Ciência, Teconologia e Inovação (POCI 2010) of the 
Quadro Comunitário de Apoio III, which is financed by FEDER and Portuguese funds. 
Technology resistance and globalisation with trade unions:
the choice between employment protection and flexicurity∗
Kjell Erik Lommerud†and Odd Rune Straume‡
October 2007
Abstract
We analyse how diﬀerent labour market institutions — employment protection ver-
sus ‘flexicurity’ — aﬀect technology adoption in unionised firms. The analysis is cast
in a setting of corporate globalisation, where domestic unionised labour face the dou-
ble threat of labour-saving technological innovations and international outsourcing of
domestic production. In the main part of the analysis, we analyse trade unions’ in-
centives to oppose or endorse the adoption of new technology. Our main result is
that both weaker employment protection and a higher reservation wage for unionsed
workers (interpreted as increased ‘flexicurity’) contribute to making trade unions more
willing to accept labour-saving technological change. Furthermore, these eﬀects are
reinforced by globalisation. In an extension to the main analysis, we endogenise the
technological progress by studying firms’ incentives to invest in new technology and
find that these incentives are also generally strengthened in a labour market with more
‘flexicurity’.
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1 Introduction
The rich countries of the world are similar in so many respects, but labour market relations
diﬀer quite significantly. A dividing line is often drawn between the flexible labour market
of the US and the more regulated ones in Europe. Sometimes the lack of European labour
market flexibility has been denoted ‘eurosclerosis’ (see, e.g., Bentolila and Bertola, 1990)
and given as a reason why Europe lags behind the US in a time of rapid technological
change and globalisation.
However, labour markets can be less than flexible in many ways, and the economic
performance of European countries vary considerably. Many countries oﬀer employment
protection in various forms. This makes it costly to lay oﬀ workers, which is beneficial (at
least in the shorter term) for workers who are already hired. But too strong employment
protection can reduce the willingness of firms too hire people in the first place, and the work
force can get stuck in old ways of production, with too little restructuring and technological
and organisational change. ‘Flexicurity’ is sometimes seen as an alternative to employment
protection. Flexicurity purportedly exists in Scandinavia and the Netherlands, and the
key elements are low employment protection, good unemployment insurance (and other
means of income support for people outside the labour market), and an emphasis on labour
market training and skill development to ease (re)entry into paid work.1
Flexicurity has become somewhat of a buzzword among policy makers. For example,
the 2005 Employment Outlook (OECD, 2005) recommends countries as Germany and
France to adopt a labour market model inspired by Denmark. There is also an up-start
economics literature that discusses flexicurity and employment protection within formal
models, something we shall return to.
The present paper is also an attempt to employ formal economic modelling to get
to grips with the flexicurity debate. A salient feature of the model is that workers are
unionised. Those countries where authorities try to regulate the income security of work-
1Some claim that the flexicurity concept should be reserved as a description of the Danish labour
market only, since Denmark has less employment protection than some other candidate countries with
high unemployment insurance and active labour market policies (Andersen and Svarer, 2006).
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ers, by employment protection, high unemployment insurance benefits, or the like, are
typically countries also with other deviations from free, competitive labour markets, with
trade unionism as a prime example. Trade unions are still important in most West-
European economies. Membership rates may have fallen in some countries, but coverage
— the number of workers covered by a union wage agreement — has fallen much less.2 The
UK is perhaps the prime example of unions markedly losing influence over the last couple
of decades, but even for this country it can be asked if unions ‘have turned the corner’?3
Notice also that trade unionism remains strong in those countries that are foremostly asso-
ciated with flexicurity, as the Scandinavian countries. We therefore think it is interesting
to ask how regulations as employment protection and unemployment benefits interact with
unionised wage setting.
‘Flexibility’ in the labour market is a rather vague concept that can be given many
interpretations. In our formal model, what we think of as flexibility is the adoption of new
labour-saving technologies in firms. We make the reasonable assumption that trade unions
have some influence on the use of technology. At first we exaggerate this by assuming that
the union can veto the adoption of any technology that is not in the best interest of
the union membership. As in Dowrick and Spencer (1994) and Lommerud, Meland and
Straume (2006), this is a stylised way to capture that unions — being concerned about job
losses among their members — can use their collective power to, if not permanently block,
then at least significantly delay, and make more costly, the adoption of labour-saving
technology. This is typically done by, e.g., refusing to concede to the changes in manning
rules, remuneration systems and the like that new technology requires.4 In a subsequent
version of the model, we use the assumption that technology is endogenous: the firm can
install labour-saving technology at a cost, but takes into account the wage response of
the trade union. A key question in the paper is if income protection for the unemployed
triggers the use of new technology, whereas employment protection is bad for technology
2For documentation, see OECD (1997) and EEAG (2004).
3Blanden, Machin and Van Reenen (2006).
4See, e.g., Dowrick and Spencer (1994) and Lommerud et al. (2006) for comprehensive analyses and
discussions — including many empirical and anectodal examples — of such ‘rational Luddism’ by trade
unions.
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adoption — or is it perhaps the other way around?
The model also introduces globalisation in a specific sense. We want to capture the
notion that while employment protection can be good for employment in the short-run,
it can also spell less employment-generating investments in the long-run. In the second
of two periods, the firm can choose to produce its output domestically or abroad. To
build capacity abroad is associated with an increasing, convex cost function — so it will
never be the case that all production takes place in a foreign location. Everything that
drives up the cost of using domestic labour will make the oﬀshoring option more tempting.
In our model, then, unionised workers face the potential double threat of labour-saving
technological change and oﬀshoring of jobs.
Within this general framework, we investigate how two parameters, an employment
protection variable (the cost of laying people oﬀ) and a reservation wage variable (the
utility of unionised workers outside the firm in question), aﬀect technology adoption. We
interpret ‘flexicurity’ as an increase in the reservation wage and a decrease in employment
protection. We are foremostly interested in how flexicurity influences adoption of labour-
saving technological advances.
A key result is that flexicurity is good for technology adoption. The increase in reserva-
tion wage and the decrease in employment protection will both contribute towards higher
union willingness to adopt technology. Furthermore, the magnitude of both these eﬀects
increase with ‘globalisation’, that is, the ease with which a firm can oﬀshore its production.
Moving labour markets institution towards the flexicurity ideal therefore becomes more
important the more internationalised production becomes.
The result that flexicurity is good for technology adoption is certainly not straightfor-
ward, since a first-glance intuition might suggest that stronger employment protection, by
reducing job losses due to labour-saving innovations and thereby reducing the downside
of technological change, should rather make trade unions more willing to accept techno-
logical change. This intuition is correct all else equal. However, when comparing diﬀerent
labour market institutions, all else is not equal. More specifically, but without going too
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much into detail at this stage, a change in the degree of employment protection (resp.
‘flexicurity’) changes the wage-employment equilibrium and thereby changes the labour
market eﬀects of labour-saving innovations.
The flexicurity debate is often presented as a comparison of two European models. Less
often is flexicurity compared with a non-interference type labour market as the US one. If
one takes the existence of at least some union power as a starting point, our results suggest
that non-interference is not a solution that best stimulates technology adoption. On the
contrary, introducing minimum wages or social insurance that lifts the reservation wage
of workers that lose their jobs — from the non-interference level — encourages technology
adoption. A union that contemplates vetoing labour-saving technology, will weigh the
wage benefit of the remaining more productive workers against the loss for workers that
lose their jobs. Given that labour demand elasticity is increasing in the wage level, we
show that the higher union wage level associated with a good reservation utility will tilt
the union’s trade-oﬀ more towards accepting the new technology.
The pre-existing academic economics literature on the flexicurity vs. employment
protection debate is small, and little focussed on technology choices. Nevertheless, we
would like to mention some related work. First we would want to point out the link to
the debate in the Nordic trade union movement, spurred by the two Swedish trade union
economists Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner (see Turvey, 1952). They argued that it
was important to keep wages up in traditional industry, to increase the rate of structural
change and modernization. On the other hand, unemployment insurance and active labour
market policies should be used to ease the situation for workers who lost their jobs and
to speed up their re-entry into the labour market. (Agell and Lommerud (1993) and
Moene and Wallerstein (1997) provide two diﬀerent attempts at capturing these ideas in
neoclassical economics models. Staiger (1988) provides a somewhat related model, where
unions drive out the most labour-intensive production to other countries, something which
enables the union to take out a higher union rent.)
One important ingredient in the flexicurity debate is unemployment insurance. Ace-
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moglu and Shimer (2000) point out that unemployment insurance can yield productivity
gains. In particular, insurance can motivate workers to move to higher productivity jobs
and also motivate firms to create those jobs. Hassler and Rodriguez Mora (2007) charac-
terise optimal unemployment insurance when workers can move and/or retrain, and find
that the classical result that benefits should fall with unemployment duration no longer
necessarily holds. Both of the latter papers picture ‘flexibility’ to mean structural and ge-
ographical mobility in the labour market, in contrast to our emphasis on the installment
of labour-saving technology.
The other important ingredient in flexicurity is the reduction of employment protec-
tion. Bertola (2004) gives an overview of the debate on labour market institutions in
Europe, with one emphasis on the consequences of employment protection. His focus is
on structural change, rather than technology adoption.5
Blanchard and Tirole (2007) study the optimal design both of unemployment insurance
and employment protection. In a first-best version of the model they find that unemploy-
ment insurance always should be accompanied by employment protection — and go on to
discuss various deviations from this first-best model. We do not study the joint optimality
of unemployment insurance and employment protection, but instead focus on the positive
question how more unemploymnet insurance and less employment protection influence the
adoption of new technology. Blanchard and Tirole do not focus on technology adoption,
and trade unions and globalisation are not mentioned. Algan and Cahuc (2006) postulate
that the tendency to cheat on unempolyment insurance programmes is larger in some
countries than in others. This can make flexicurity the optimal choice for some Northern
European countries, while it is not necessarily optimal to copy this policy in countries
closer to the Mediterrean.6
Lastly, we would like to draw attention to the relatively large literature on how trade
unionism influence the technology choices of the firm. See, for example, Tauman and
5Ichino and Riphahn (2005) discuss employment protection in the context of absenteeism. Dewit,
Leahy and Montagna (2003) and Kessing (2006) discuss the possible strategic advantages from employment
protection — building on the key insight that a firm that only costly can get rid of its workers, will fight
harder to retain market shares.
6Boeri, Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2006) bring political economy elements into the flexicurity debate.
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Weiss (1987), Ulph and Ulph (1998), Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre (2002) and Haucap
and Wey (2004). There is no mention of flexicurity in these papers.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The basic model is presented in the next
section. In Section 3, we analyse union resistance to an exogenous technological change.
In Section 4, we endogenise the technology by analysing firm incentives to invest in better
technology. The paper is concluded by Section 5.
2 Model
A unionised firm exists for two periods. In both periods, wages are set by a monopoly trade
union, while employment is set by the firm. Two things happen before the start of period
2: the firm is able — due to investment liberalisation — to build up production capacity
abroad, in a non-unionised environment. Furthermore, a new labour-saving technology is
available in domestic production. However, due to employment protection legislation, it
is costly for the firm to downsize domestic employment.
The firm is a monopolist in the product market, where demand is equal in both periods.
The inverse demand function is given by the linear form7
p (qi) = α− βqi, (1)
where qi is produced quantity in period i. Labour is the only factor of production in
a simple linear technology. Denoting domestic employment in period i by Li, produced
output in the two periods is given by, respectively,
q1 = L1 (2)
7A linear demand function is chosen for analytical simplicity, but our results generalise well beoynd
the linear specification. As we will show later, the main results depend on the assumption that the wage
elasticity of labour demand is increasing in the wage level. This holds for a wide class of demand functions
(see Footnote 16).
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and
q2 = φL2 + qf , (3)
where qf is output from production abroad. The firm can build up capacity abroad —
using foreign contractors and/or establishing greenfield plants — according to a strictly
increasing, convex and twice diﬀerentiable cost function K (qf ). For simplicity, we assume
that all costs of serving the market (including production and trade costs) are included in
K (·). Henceforth, we will refer to qf as the level of oﬀshoring. We also assume K (·) to
be suﬃciently convex to preclude all production being oﬀshored.
Technological progress from period 1 to period 2 is measured by the technology para-
meter φ > 1, and we equip the trade union with the power to block the introduction of
the new technology in period 2. Thus, technology adoption requires that both the firm
and the trade union benefit from it.
With the above assumptions, profits in period 1 and 2, respectively, are given by
π1 = p (q1) q1 − w1L1, (4)
π2 =



p (q2) q2 − w2L2 − c (L1 − L2)−K (qf ) if L2 < L1
p (q2) q2 − w2L2 −K (qf ) if L2 ≥ L1
. (5)
The degree of employment protection is given by the parameter c > 0, in the case of
second-period downsizing of domestic employment.8 ,9 Throughout the analysis, we will
focus exclusively on this (most interesting) case, where L2 < L1.
Trade union objectives are given by the following Stone-Geary-type utility function for
period i:
Ui = (wi − b)θ Li, (6)
8We focus on the red tape component of employment protection legislation. As noted by Boeri et al.
(2006), both empirical evidence (Bertola et al, 2000) and economic theory (Lazear, 1990) suggest that it
is mainly red tape and procedural costs that aﬀect employment flows.
9As pointed out by Bentolila and Bertola (1990), the eﬀects of employment protection laws are arguably
best approximated by a fixed firing cost per worker, implying linear employment downsizing costs.
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where θ > 0 is a measure of the degree of wage orientation in union preferences10, while
b > 0 is the reservation (reference) wage level. It is reasonable, and standard, to assume
that b reflects both opportunities outside the firm (e.g., the minimum wage level) and
outside the labour market (e.g., unemployment benefits). We also make the assumption
that b > c. This assumption — as we will show later — ensures that the firm has no
incentives to enforce a lower productivity on its workforce ex post.
We consider a game of complete and perfect information, with the following sequence
of events:
1. (a) The union sets the first-period wage w1.
(b) The firms sets first-period employment L1.
2. (a) The union decides whether to block the introduction of the new technology.
(b) The firm decides the level of oﬀshoring qf .
(c) The union sets second-period wages w2.
(d) The firms sets second-period (domestic) employment L2.
Notice that the ordering of decisions 2a and 2b is not crucial for the analysis, as long
as both decisions are made before wages and employment are determined in period 2.
We look for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, solving the game by
backwards induction.
2.1 Second-period employment and wages
Maximising the second-period profit function with respect to L2, and assuming that L2 <
L1, domestic labour demand in period 2 is given by
L2 (w2, qf ) =
αφ− w2 + c
2βφ2
− qfφ . (7)
10The parameter θ can indirectly be interpreted as the degree of ‘insider’ domination. A trade union
that is more dominated by insiders will typically give more importance to wages (all else equal).
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For a given wage, second-period labour demand is increasing in the degree of employment
protection and decreasing in the degree of oﬀshoring, as expected.
The trade union maximises its utility by choosing a wage level that optimally balances
the concerns for wages and employment. The first-order condition for the optimal second-
period wage level is given by
ε2 (w2, qf ) =
θw2
w2 − b
, (8)
where ε2 (·) := − (∂L2/∂w2) / (w2/L2) is the wage elasticity of second-period labour de-
mand, defined for a given level of oﬀshoring. Since the expression on the right-hand side
of (8) is decreasing in w2, we directly obtain the well-known result that the equilibrium
wage is decreasing in the degree of labour demand elasticity.11 From (7) we can derive an
explicit expression for the second-period labour demand elasticity:
ε2 (w2, qf ) =
w2
φ (α− 2βqf )− w2 + c
. (9)
Many of the main results of the paper can be derived from changes in the wage elasticity
of labour demand. It is therefore instructive to take a closer look at the determinants of
this elasticity. Notice first that, since an increase in φmakes labour demand less responsive
to wage changes,12 there is a negative relationship between labour productivity and labour
demand elasticity. Consequently, technological progress is accompanied by higher wages.
Consider the eﬀect of employment protection. It follows directly from (9) that stronger
employment protection makes second-period labour demand less elastic. Given that the
firm wants to downsize domestic employment in the second period, an increase in c makes
this more costly for the firm and the fall in second-period labour demand will consequently
be smaller. The wage elasticity of labour demand is correspondingly reduced. The degree
of oﬀshoring, qf , has the opposite eﬀect. A higher oﬀshoring level naturally reduces
11See Oswald (1985) for an excellent early survey of the classical trade union models and their properties.
12This is easily verified by observing, from (7), that the slope of the labour demand function is given by
∂L2 (·)
∂w2
= − 1
2βφ2
.
,
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domestic labour demand, with a corresponding increase in labour demand elasticity.
The two remaining key parameters, θ and b, does not aﬀect the wage elasticity of
labour demand. Thus, we can see directly from (8), that, for a given level of oﬀshoring, an
increase in either of the two parameters will increase the equilibrium second-period wage.
We can summarise the determinants of second-period wages as follows:
Proposition 1 The equilibrium second-period wage is increasing in the degree of employ-
ment protection, union wage orientation, labour productivity and the reservation wage
level, and decreasing in the degree of oﬀshoring.
The explicit expressions for equilibrium second-period wages and employment are easily
derived. Inserting (9) into (8), second-period union utility is maximised at the wage level
w∗2 =
θ (φ (α− 2qfβ) + c) + b
1 + θ . (10)
Equilibrium domestic employment is then found by substituting (10) in (7), yielding
L∗2 =
φ (α− 2qfβ)− (b− c)
2βφ2 (θ + 1)
. (11)
We assume that L∗2 > 0, which requires that oﬀshoring is suﬃciently costly. For a given
level of oﬀshoring, both second-period wages and second-period employment are increasing
in the degree of employment protection. Notice that the employment eﬀect of improved
technology is a priori ambiguous. We will return to a full analysis and discussion of this
relationship in Section 3.
2.2 Oﬀshoring
The firm chooses a degree of oﬀshoring that maximises (5), taking into account how the
oﬀshoring decision aﬀects second-period wages. Substituting from (10) and (11) into (5),
and assuming that L1 > L2, the first-order condition for the optimal level of oﬀshoring is
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given by13
θ (2 + θ)φ (α− 2qfβ) + b− c
φ (θ + 1)2
−K 0 (qf ) = 0, (12)
which implicitly defines a function q∗f = qf (θ, φ, α , β, b, c). We see that, due to the lin-
earity of employment downsizing costs, q∗f does not depend on any first-period decisions.
Comparative statics results are obtained by totally diﬀerentiating (12), yielding
∂q∗f
∂θ =
4βq∗2
2θβ (θ + 2) + (θ + 1)2K 00
³
q∗f
´ > 0, (13)
∂q∗f
∂c = −
∂q∗f
∂b =
−1
φ
³
2θβ (θ + 2) + (θ + 1)2K 00
³
q∗f
´´ < 0, (14)
∂q∗f
∂φ =
− (b− c)
φ2
³
2θβ (θ + 2) + (θ + 1)2K 00
³
q∗f
´´ < 0. (15)
Proposition 2 The equilibrium level of oﬀshoring is increasing in the degree of union
wage orientation and the reservation wage level, and decreasing in the degree of employ-
ment protection and domestic technological progress.
A more wage oriented union implies that domestic production is more costly for the
firm, due to higher domestic wages. Consequently, the firm finds it profitable to oﬀshore
more production. Notice the importance of the timing of the game for this result: it is, by
implicit assumption, not possible for the union to commit to a lower wage level in order
to keep a larger share of production at home. The same argument is behind the positive
relationship between the domestic reservation wage and the extent of oﬀshoring. A higher
reservation wage pushes up the domestic wage level, inducing the firm to oﬀshore more
production.
Employment protection, on the other hand, has the opposite eﬀect on oﬀshoring in-
centives. Although stronger employment protection leads to higher second-period wages,
which — in isolation — should lead to more oﬀshoring, the direct cost of oﬀshoring also
increases, since it becomes more costly for the firm to downsize production at home. The
13Non-concavity of K (·) ensures that the second-order condition is satisfied.
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second eﬀect always dominates, yielding a negative relationship between the degree of em-
ployment protection and oﬀshoring incentives. A similar eﬀect is established with respect
to domestic technological progress. Although part of any productivity increase is absorbed
by higher domestic wages, the profitability of domestic production nevertheless increases
(which we will show more rigorously in the next section), making oﬀshoring of production
less attractive to the firm.
2.3 First-period employment and wages
Both the firm and the trade union make their first-period choices by maximising the sum of
first- and second-period payoﬀs. For simplicity, we abstract from discounting. Maximising
π1 + π2 with respect to L1, and assuming that L2 < L1, first-period labour demand is
given by
L1 (w1) =
α− c− w1
2β . (16)
Due to the linearity of employment downsizing costs, first-period labour demand does
not depend on second-period wages. It is only the degree of employment protection that
matters.
Optimal first-period wage setting by the trade union is determined by the same mech-
anisms that were given a thorough treatment in Section 2.1, and the results are — with the
exception of the eﬀect of employment protection — qualitatively similar. In this subsection,
we focus more on dynamic employment eﬀects. Inserting (16) into (6), the equilibrium
first-period wage is given by
w∗1 =
θ (α− c) + b
θ + 1 , (17)
which yield equilibrium first-period employment
L∗1 =
α− b− c
2β (θ + 1) . (18)
Notice that the equilibrium wage and employment in the first-period are independent of
second-period decisions.
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The eﬀect of employment protection on wages and employment diﬀers diametrically
in the first and second period. Stronger employment protection implies that it is more
costly for the firm to operate with a large workforce in the first period, given the incentives
for second-period downsizing. Thus, stronger employment protection yields lower labour
demand in the first period. In other words, the positive eﬀect on employment in the second
period is counteracted by a negative first-period eﬀect. Correspondingly, employment
protection causes a wage reduction in the first-period.
What about the overall eﬀect on employment? This is given by
∂
³
L∗1 (c) + L∗2
³
c, q∗f (c)
´´
∂c =
∂L∗1
∂c
−
+
∂L∗2
∂c
+
+
∂L∗2
∂qf
∂q∗f
∂c| {z }
+
, (19)
confirming that employment protection reduces the negative employment eﬀects of oﬀ-
shoring and labour-saving technology in the second-period, at the cost of lower employ-
ment in the first period. Using (11), (14) and (18), the total eﬀect can be expressed
as
∂ (L∗1 + L∗2)
∂c = −
1
φ (θ + 1)

φ
2 − 1
2βφ −
1
φ
³
K 00
³
q∗f
´
(θ + 1)2 + 2θβ (θ + 2)
´

 . (20)
The total employment eﬀect is negative if the sign of the expression in the square brack-
ets is positive. We see that this will be the case if oﬀshoring is suﬃciently costly, or,
more precisely, if the oﬀshoring cost function is suﬃciently convex. Thus, in the absence
of oﬀshoring possibilities, employment protection always has a negative overall eﬀect on
employment, when dynamic incentives are taken into account. However, with the possi-
bility of oﬀshoring, employment protection has a dampening eﬀect on the firm’s oﬀshoring
incentives, which — due to the linearity of employment protection costs — do not aﬀect
first-period decisions. This dampening eﬀect is stronger the less convex the oﬀshoring cost
function is, as can be seen from (14). Consequently, if this eﬀect is suﬃciently strong,
employment protection might have an overall positive eﬀect on domestic employment.
14
From (20) we see that this is more likely the more employment oriented the trade union
is (increasing the second term in the square brackets).
An interesting implication of the above result and discussion is that globalisation makes
employment protection a potentially more eﬀective instrument to stimulate domestic em-
ployment. However, it should be said that this conclusion is likely to depend on the
assumption that oﬀshoring of all production is not a possibility. If the firm also has the
option to move the entire production abroad, stronger employment protection, while reduc-
ing the degree of partial oﬀshoring, might well increase the probability that all production
is oﬀshored.
We summarise the eﬀects of employment protection on domestic equilibrium employ-
ment as follows:
Proposition 3 Stronger employment protection reduces the negative employment eﬀect of
oﬀshoring and labour-saving technology ex post, but also reduces equilibrium employment
ex ante. The overall eﬀect is always negative if oﬀshoring is not a possibility. In the
case of oﬀshoring, the total employment eﬀect of stronger employment protection can be
positive if the convexity of the oﬀshoring cost function is suﬃciently low.
3 Technological progress
Will the new labour-saving technology be adopted in the second-period? We assess this
question by investigating the eﬀect of a marginal increase in the technology parameter φ
on second-period payoﬀs. Before analysing union incentives, let us first confirm that the
firm always benefits from better production technology. Using the Envelope Theorem, the
eﬀect on second-period profits of a marginal increase in labour productivity is given by
dπ2
dφ =
∂π2
∂φ +
∂π2
∂w2
∂w∗2
∂φ =
(b− c)L∗2
φ (θ + 1) , (21)
which is unambiguously positive, given that b > c. It can also be shown that the firm has
no incentive to enforce a lower productivity on its workforce ex post. For a given level of
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employment, the eﬀect of increased productivity on profits is given by
∂π2 (L2)
∂φ = L2 [α− 2β (q2 + qf )] . (22)
Inserting the equilibrium level of employment, from (11), yields
∂π2 (L2)
∂φ
¯¯¯¯
L2=L∗2
=
θφ (α− 2qfβ) + b− c
φ (θ + 1) L
∗
2, (23)
which, again, is always unambiguously positive if b > c.
3.1 Union resistance against technological progress
Due to the monopoly union assumption, whether or not improved technology increases
union utility is given by the eﬀect on labour demand. Applying the Envelope Theorem,
the eﬀect of technological change on second-period union utility is, on general form, given
by
dU2
h
w∗2 (φ) , L2
³
w∗2 (φ) , q∗f (φ) , φ
´i
dφ =
∂U2 (·)
∂L2
µ
∂L2
∂φ +
∂L2
∂qf
∂qf
∂φ
¶¯¯¯¯
w2=w∗2 ; qf=q∗f
. (24)
Thus, the union will oppose technological change if
µ
∂L2
∂φ +
∂L2
∂qf
∂qf
∂φ
¶¯¯¯¯
w2=w∗2 ; qf=q∗f
< 0. (25)
In words, the union will oppose technological change if it leads to a drop in labour demand.
This exact result is derived from the monopoly union assumption. Since the union is free
to set the desired wage level, it is indiﬀerent to marginal wage changes at the optimal
level; only labour demand eﬀects matter. Thus, we need to take a closer look at the eﬀect
of technological progress on labour demand.14
There are two counteracting eﬀects of improved labour productivity on labour demand.
14The subsequent discussion is indebted to the pioneering work of Dowrick and Spencer (1994). See also
Lommerud et al. (2006).
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On the one hand, the eﬀective wage rate (w2/φ) drops, which tends to increase labour
demand. On the other hand, though, fewer workers are needed to produce a given level
of output, which tends to reduce labour demand. What determines the relative strength
of these two eﬀects? From (7), using the definition of labour demand elasticity, we derive
the labour demand eﬀect of technological progress for a given level of second-period wages
and oﬀshoring:
∂L2 (w2, qf )
∂φ =
w2
³
1− 1ε2
´
− c
2φ3β
. (26)
We see that, for a given level of qf , a positive labour demand response to technological
progress requires that labour demand is suﬃciently wage elastic. This is quite intuitive,
since the first eﬀect mentioned above — the (positive) labour demand response to a fall in
the eﬀective wage rate — increases with the wage elasticity of labour demand. If labour
demand is very elastic, a marginal reduction in the eﬀective wage rate (w2/φ) leads to
a more than proportional increase in the demand for eﬀective labour (φL2). With no
employment protection, i.e., c = 0, we see that the critical level of labour demand elasticity
is unity.15 However, notice the eﬀect of employment protection. An increase in c pushes up
second-period labour demand, reducing the likelihood that better technology will increase
labour demand even further. Thus, with c > 0, technological progress will increase labour
demand, for a given level of qf , only if labour demand elasticity is suﬃciently larger than
1.
While (26) shows only the direct labour demand eﬀect for a given level of oﬀshoring,
there is also an indirect eﬀect via the firm’s oﬀshoring decision. We already know that
this indirect eﬀect is positive, since better domestic technology dampens the incentive for
oﬀshoring. Using (7) and (15) in conjunction with (26), the total labour demand eﬀect of
technological progress, at the equilibrium wage and oﬀshoring level, is given by
15This result, which generalises beoynd the linear demand specification, was first demonstrated by
Dowrick and Spencer (1994).
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µ
∂L2
∂φ +
∂L2
∂qf
∂qf
∂φ
¶¯¯¯¯
w2=w∗2 ; qf=q∗f
=
[ε2 (w∗2)− 1]
h
φθ
³
α− 2q∗fβ
´
+ b
i
− c [θ + ε2 (w∗2)]
2φ3β (θ + 1) ε2 (w∗2)
+
(b− c)
φ3
h
2θβ (θ + 2) + (θ + 1)2K 00
³
q∗f
´i . (27)
It is straightforward to verify that this expression is positive if labour demand is suﬃciently
elastic. The indirect labour demand eﬀect via the oﬀshoring decision is given by the second
term in (27). Since this term is positive, we cannot unambiguously determine whether
ε2 > 1 is a necessary condition for technological progress to increase labour demand.
As long as the labour demand function is not iso-elastic, the condition given in (27)
directly translates into a condition on union preferences. In line with previous literature,
we can therefore express the condition for union resistance to technological progress in
terms of the preference parameter θ. Given that the wage elasticity of labour demand
increases with the wage level — which holds for a wide class of demand functions, including
the linear one16 — a more wage oriented trade union will choose a wage on a more elastic
part of the labour demand curve. Thus, there exists a unique critical value θ∗, such that
dU/dφ < (>) 0 if θ < (>) θ∗. We can go some way towards characterising θ∗ by rewriting
(27). Using the expression for ε2 (w∗2) and rearranging, the condition for union opposition
to technological change is given by
α− 2q∗fβ
(θ + 1) 2βφ2
+
(θ − 1)
−/+
+
β
¡
5θ + 2θ2 + 1
¢
+K 00 (qf ) (θ + 1)2
βφ3 (θ + 1)
³
2θβ (θ + 2) +K 00 (qf ) (θ + 1)2
´
+
(b− c)
+
< 0. (28)
The second term is unambiguously positive, while the sign of the first term depends on
whether the union is wage or employment oriented. It follows from (28) that, if the union
is opposed to the labour-saving innovation, it must be employment oriented, i.e., θ < 1. In
16From the definition of ε (·), we have that
∂ε (·)
∂w =
ε (·)
w [1 + ε (·)]−
∂2L (·)
∂w2
w
L (·) ,
implying that ∂ε (·) /∂w > 0 for concave, linear and ‘not too convex’ labour demand functions.
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general, the union will oppose technological change if it is suﬃciently employment oriented.
In order to derive an explicit solution for the critical value θ∗, we now assign a quadratic
form to the oﬀshoring cost function by letting K (qf ) = k2q2f . We will interpret the cost
parameter k as an inverse measure of ‘globalisation’. Using the quadratic form, the equi-
librium level of oﬀshoring is given by
q∗f =
θ (θ + 2)αφ+ b− c
φ
³
k (θ + 1)2 + 2θ (θ + 2)β
´ . (29)
Equation (28) implicitly defines a critical level of employment orientation, θ∗, below which
the union will oppose technological change. Using (29), this critical level is given by
θ∗ = 1− 2 (k + 2β) (b− c)kαφ . (30)
We will refer to θ∗ as a measure of union resistance to technological change by applying
the following argument: if there are many union-firm pairs in the economy and union pref-
erences are distributed over a wide range of θ, some unions will resist new technology while
others will endorse it. An increase (reduction) in θ∗ then implies that more (fewer) unions
will resist technological progress, implying an overall increase in technology resistance by
trade unions. The comparative statics properties of θ∗ are easily derived:
∂θ∗
∂c = −
∂θ∗
∂b =
2 (k + 2β)
αφk > 0, (31)
∂θ∗
∂k =
4β (b− c)
αφk2 > 0. (32)
Proposition 4 Union resistance to technological change
(i) increases with the degree of employment protection,
(ii) decreases with the level of the reservation wage,
(iii) decreases with the degree of globalisation.
The magnitudes of all these eﬀects increase with the degree of globalisation.
The intuition behind these results can be traced by considering the key equation (27),
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which illustrates the labour demand eﬀect, in equilibrium, of better technology. We see
that the parameter c works through three diﬀerent channels. First, stronger employment
protection implies, all else equal, that the second-period employment level is higher. This
increases the critical degree of labour demand elasticity necessary for a positive labour
demand response to better technology, as can be seen from the first term in (27). Sec-
ond, stronger employment protection implies, all else equal, that labour demand becomes
less elastic, as shown and discussed in Section 2.1. Third, there is also an eﬀect via the
firm’s oﬀshoring decision, given by the second-term in (27). With a convex oﬀshoring cost
function, stronger employment protection implies that the reduction in oﬀshoring, due to
better domestic technology, is smaller. Thus, all three eﬀects work in the same direction,
reducing the likelihood of a positive labour demand response to better technology. In
other words, stronger employment protection increases the degree of labour demand elas-
ticity (equivalently, the degree of union wage orientation) necessary to induce a positive
labour demand response from technological progress. Consequently, union resistance to
technological change becomes more likely.
With respect to technology resistance, an increase in the reservation wage level, b,
has the exact opposite eﬀect, qualitatively and quantitatively, as stronger employment
protection. The main eﬀect is via the labour demand elasticity: an increase in b pushes
up the domestic wage level, with a corresponding increase in oﬀshoring, making second-
period labour demand more elastic, as can be seen from (9). In addition, the negative
relationship between domestic labour productivity and oﬀshoring is increasing in b. As
we can see from (27), both eﬀects work in the same direction, making a positive labour
demand response more probable, thereby reducing the likelihood of technology resistance
from the trade union.
A reduction in k increases the equilibrium level of oﬀshoring, and this increases the
positive labour demand response from domestic technological progress, as reflected in
the second term of (27). In addition, increased oﬀshoring increases the wage elasticity
of second-period labour demand, as we can see from (9). Both eﬀects work in the same
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direction, and globalisation thus increases the scope for a positive labour demand response
to domestic technological progress, making union resistance less likely.
Notice that all of the above eﬀects are quantitatively increasing in the degree of glob-
alisation, inversely measured by the parameter k. The reason is simply that a lower k
increases the magnitude of labour demand responses via the firm’s oﬀshoring decision.
With respect to policy implications, the main message is that the parameters c and b
represent diﬀerent labour market policies, that have opposite eﬀects on union resistance
towards technological change. While stronger employment protection is likely to slow
down technology adoption, due a more union resistance, better outside options — such as
a higher legal minimum wage or higher unemployment benefits — are likely to increase
technology adoption. Furthermore, the qualitative diﬀerence between these policy options
will quantitatively increase with the degree of globalisation.
4 Endogenous technology
So far we have focused on the incentives for rational Luddism by a trade union facing an
exogenous and certain technological shock. In this section we depart from the assumption
of an exogenous technology shock by looking at the firm’s incentives to invest in better
technology. Assume that the firm can make an investment in the first period to improve
the domestic technology in the second period. Temporarily putting aside the question of
union resistance to technological progress, we ask how the characteristics of the labour
market institutions — given by the parameters c, b, and θ — aﬀect the firm’s incentives to
invest in better technology.
4.1 Certain technology
Assume that the firm can make an investment in period 1 that yields a certain productivity
φ > 1 in the second period. This investment will be undertaken if the (certain) payoﬀ is
suﬃciently large to cover the investment costs. Since the first-period profit is independent
of second-period productivity, the investment payoﬀ is given by the second-period profit
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diﬀerential Ω := π2 (φ) − π2 (1). Using the quadratic oﬀshoring function, the investment
payoﬀ is given by
Ω = 1
4
(φ− 1) (b− c) 2kαφ− (φ+ 1) (k + 2β) (b− c)
βφ2
³
2θβ (θ + 2) + k (θ + 1)2
´ > 0. (33)
Notice that the assumption of L∗2 > 0 ensures that Ω > 0. Naturally, the firm’s incentives
to invest will increase with the magnitude of Ω.
Proposition 5 (i) Unless the resulting productivity increase is very small, the firm’s in-
centives to invest in better technology is decreasing in the degree of employment protection
and increasing in the reservation wage level.
(ii) The firm’s incentives to invest in better technology is always decreasing in the
union’s wage orientation.
Proof. (i) From (33) we derive
∂Ω
∂c = −
∂Ω
∂b = −
1
2
(φ− 1) kαφ− (φ+ 1) (k + 2β) (b− c)
βφ2
³
2θβ (θ + 2) + k (θ + 1)2
´ .
The assumption of L∗2 > 0 is equivalent to kαφ− (k + 2β) (b− c) > 0. It is easily verified
that this assumption implies that the numerator in the above expressions is increasing in
φ, and that there exists a set of parameters, for low values of φ, where L∗2 > 0 and the
numerator is negative, implying ∂Ω/∂c = −∂Ω/∂b > 0. Otherwise, unless φ is very low,
∂Ω/∂c = −∂Ω/∂b < 0.
(ii) From (33) we derive
∂Ω
∂θ = − (θ + 1) (φ− 1) (b− c) (k + 2β)
2kαφ− (φ+ 1) (k + 2β) (b− c)
2βφ2
³
2θβ (θ + 2) + k (θ + 1)2
´2 < 0.
The intuition for these results are traced by considering the profit eﬀect of a marginal
technological progress, as given by (21). In equilibrium, technological progress has two
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opposite eﬀects on profits. First, for a given wage and employment level, increased pro-
ductivity increases output and profits. However, secondly, improved labour productivity
induces a wage increase which, in terms of profits, is negative. Both of of these partial
eﬀects are aﬀected by changes in the relevant parameters: c, b and θ.
Changes in both employment protection and the reservation wage work indirectly
through changes in the equilibrium levels of domestic employment and oﬀshoring. Consider
first an increase in employment protection (c). This leads to a higher level of second-
period domestic employment, with a corresponding reduction in oﬀshoring. A higher level
of domestic employment increases the negative profit eﬀect of higher domestic wages.
Furthermore, a lower level of oﬀshoring also implies that the technology-induced wage
increase is larger, as can be seen from (10). Increased domestic employment also aﬀects
the direct profit gain of technological progress (for a given wage level). This eﬀect is, in
general, ambiguous; an increase in domestic employment is more likely to increase the
profit gain of technological progress if the labour stock is relatively low to begin with.
Unless the productivity increase is very low, the two former eﬀects always dominate,
reducing the profitability of technological progress for the firm.
The eﬀect of a higher reservation wage level is quantitatively similar, but with an
opposite sign. A higher reservation wage pushes up the wage level, leading to reduced
domestic employment, with a corresponding increase in oﬀshoring. The eﬀects are thus
exactly opposite to an increase in employment protection: unless the productivity increase
is very low, the profitability of technological progress always increases in b.
A more wage oriented union, on the other hand, reduces the profitability of technolog-
ical progress. An increase in wage orientation (θ) pushes up domestic wages, leading to
a reduction in domestic employment, with a corresponding increase in oﬀshoring. On the
one hand, lower domestic employment reduces the profit loss of higher wages. However,
on the other hand, the wage response is stronger. It is easily seen from (10) that a more
wage oriented union will enforce a larger wage increase following a technological progress.
Lower domestic employment also aﬀects the direct profit gain from increased productivity
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of the domestic workforce. As previously mentioned, this eﬀect is, in general, ambiguous.
In sum, though, the overall eﬀect of a more wage oriented union is always negative with
respect to the profit eﬀect of technological progress. This result clearly resembles the
well-known results by Grout (1984) and Manning (1987) about the investment-deterring
eﬀects of trade unions.
Assuming that the productivity increase from new technology is suﬃciently high, so
that ∂Ω/∂c < 0 and ∂Ω/∂b > 0, Proposition 5 actually reinforces the implications of
our previously derived results, even if the firm and the union have conflicting interests.17
Stronger employment protection not only increases union opposition towards technological
change, it also reduces firm incentives for technology investments. Similarly, better outside
options for union workers increase both the union’s willingness to accept labour-saving
technology and the firm’s incentives for investing in such technology.
However, there is also a tension with respect to union preferences. More wage oriented
unions will reduce union opposition to technological change, but at the same time reduce
firm incentives for technology investments.
4.2 Uncertain technology
In addition to the investment that yields a second-period productivity φ, assume that the
firm has also a risky investment option in the first period. The risky technology investment
yields a second-period productivity µ > φ, but only with a probability ρ < 1. How does the
labour market characteristics aﬀect the firm’s propensity to opt for the risky technology
investment?
Once more, only (expected) second-period profits matter. The payoﬀ from the safe
investment option is given by π2 (φ), while the expected payoﬀ from the risky investment
is given by ρπ2 (µ)+(1− ρ)π2 (1). Assume that both investments are equally costly. Since
µ > φ, and since second-period profits are increasing in labour productivity, the firm will
choose the risky investment if ρ is suﬃciently high. We can thus define a threshold value
17Numerical simulations show that the parameter space where ∂Ω/∂c > 0 and ∂Ω/∂b < 0 is indeed very
limited.
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of ρ for which both investment options are equally profitable. This value, denoted ρ∗, is
given by
ρ∗ = µ
2 (φ− 1) (2kαφ− (φ+ 1) (k + 2β) (b− c))
φ2 (µ− 1) (2kαµ− (µ+ 1) (k + 2β) (b− c))
. (34)
It follows that the firm will choose the risky investment if ρ > ρ∗ and the safe investment
otherwise. Thus, for given levels of µ and φ, we can interpret ρ∗ as an inverse measure of
the firm’s willingness to take risks. The comparative statics results follow straightforwardly
from (34):
∂ρ∗
∂c =
2kαµ2 (φ− 1) (k + 2β) (µ− φ)
φ2 (µ− 1) (2kαµ− (µ+ 1) (k + 2β) (b− c))2
> 0,
∂ρ∗
∂b = −
2kαµ2 (φ− 1) (k + 2β) (µ− φ)
φ2 (µ− 1) (2kαµ− (µ+ 1) (k + 2β) (b− c))2
< 0,
∂ρ∗
∂θ = 0.
Proposition 6 The firm’s willingness to undertake risky technology investments is de-
creasing in the degree of employment protection, increasing in the reservation wage level,
and is independent of union preferences.
Due to decreasing marginal revenues, the profit function is concave in labour produc-
tivity. Stronger employment protection shifts down the profit curve and also makes it more
concave, since it is more costly for the firm to optimally adjust the labour stock in response
to technological progress. This makes the firm less willing to invest in risky technology. A
higher reservation wage, on the other hand, also shifts down the profit curve but makes
it less concave, since the marginal profit gain of higher labour productivity increases with
the wage level. Thus, a higher reservation wage makes the firm more willing to invest in
risky technology.
When seen in conjunction with Proposition 5, it appears that a reduction in employ-
ment protection and/or an increase in union reservation wages do not only increase the
firm’s incentives to invest in better technology, it also makes the firm more willing to take
risks, implying a higher expected technological progress.
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5 Concluding remarks
Recent opinion polls indicate that workers in the Nordic countries fear globalisation less
than workers in other rich countries.18 This could of course stem from the fact that
they are better insured against adverse events in the labour markets. But in addition
the flexicurity type labour market arrangements in these countries can have paved the
way for structural change and technological improvements. In turn, this could mean that
the bulk of Nordic workers now have high productivity jobs that are less challenged by
globalisation than jobs with less technology content. Annenkov and Madaschi (2005)
document that since the mid-1990s the Nordic EU countries have experiences stronger
labour productivity growth than the larger EU countries. They claim that innovation and
technological changes lie behind this fact. Flexicurity is of course only one element in the
social model that has produced this outcome, but perhaps an important one. It is beyond
the scope of this paper to try to disentangle why adoption of new technology has been so
rapid in Northern Europe. Rather, the purpose of this paper has been to contribute to
this debate by carefully analysing the eﬀect of social insurance and employment protection
on trade union behaviour, on wages and employment in the industry in question, and on
the union’s willingness to accept new technology. The basic flavour of our results is a
confirmation that flexicurity is good for change. Notably, trade unionism is important
for this result. The employer side is typically willing to install labour-saving technology.
Organised workers can be harder to persuade. Flexicurity can be important because
it contributes to build down that barrier to technology adoption that trade unions can
represent.
Flexicurity is a two-legged policy, with reduced employment protection and a better
situation for laid-oﬀ workers as the two legs. Note that both of these parts of the policy
package independently encourages technology adoption. The full picture why this is the
case is complex, but here we oﬀer some sketches of the intuition. Better income security
for the laid-oﬀ also increases the wage level inside the firm domestically. This shrinks the
18Scheve and Slaughter (2006).
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domestic labour force, and more so if the firm has the option of oﬀshoring production.
With a smaller work force, labour demand becomes more elastic. A more elastic labour
demand increases the likelihood of a positive labour demand response to technological
change, making it more likely that the trade union will accept change. Lower employment
protection also makes labour demand more elastic, but in this case because the direct
cost of downsizing the workforce becomes lower. The implication for union opposition to
technological change is, however, the same. And, again, the firm’s oﬀshoring option tends
to magnify this eﬀect.
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